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Kinds, descriptions of kinds, concepts,
and distributions
Louise McNally*
Within referential approaches to meaning, Carlson’s (1977) notion of kind as an
entity has played an inuential role not only in the analysis of generic sentences,
but also in the analysis of common noun semantics within so-called “layered”
approaches to the syntax and semantics of nominals (e.g. Zamparelli 2000). Within
the latter approaches, two competing views of the role of kinds in the semantics
of nominals have developed, neither of which is entirely satisfactory. In this paper I
argue that by modeling the semantics of common nouns using distributional se-
mantic representations and connecting them in a very specic way to an otherwise
standard referential semantics, we overcome the limitations of these kind-based
accounts of the semantics of common nouns while preserving their insights. In-
sofar as distributional representations have been proposed as ersatz conceptual
representations (Lenci 2008b), the analysis also exemplies a concrete proposal
about how conceptual and referential approaches to meaning might be integrated.
1 Introduction
Carlson (1977) defended the hypothesis that natural language ontology includes
not only “ordinary” (token) object-level entities such as people or artefacts but
also kind-level entities, which are of the same semantic type but of a dierent
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sort.1 He argued that bare plurals in English (as in (1a)), as well as some uses
of denite singulars, (as in (1b)) are rigid designators that denote kind-level entities.
In other words, they could be thought of as proper names for kinds.
(1) a. Snakes are reptiles.
b. The snake is a reptile.
This hypothesis led to signicant advances in the study of genericity, and though
the specics of Carlson’s account of reference to kinds have subsequently been
the subject of much debate (see e.g. Carlson & Pelletier 1995; Mari et al. 2013), kinds
themselves have persisted in natural language ontology and have been used in the
analysis of other semantic phenomena that do not involve genericity, notably in the
internal semantics of nominals (e.g. Zamparelli 2000, Chierchia 1998, McNally
& Boleda 2004, Déprez 2005, Espinal 2010).2 Within this latter line of research,
which will be our primary focus in this paper, all analyses start from the basic idea
developed in Zamparelli 2000 that nominal expressions have a “layered” structure,
as will be described in section 2, and that kinds are somehow involved in the
semantics of the innermost or deepest layer. However, they divide into two main
groups based on the way in which kinds are appealed to in the syntax-semantics
interface: One line of analysis posits that common nouns denote kinds themselves
(i.e. a subsort of entity), while the other argues that they denote descriptions of
kinds (i.e. sets of (sub)kinds in an extensional set-theoretical semantics).
While this work as a whole has yielded considerable insights into natural
language data, the modeling of kinds as atomic entities is rather uninformative,
telling us little about what a kind actually is. Krifka (1995) suggests that kinds
correspond to sortal concepts but says little about what these are. Müller-Reichau
(2011), p. 46, suggests that kinds are reications of concepts, where he understands
a concept as “information in the mind that allows us to discriminate entities of
[one] kind from entities of other kinds” (citing Löbner 2002:20) or “accumulated
knowledge about a type of thing in the world” (citing Barsalou 2000). Note that the
1 Carlson’s ontology also included a third sort of entity, so-called stages of individuals, but these
will not be relevant in the following discussion and I will say no more about them here. Hereafter
I use the term “token entity” to refer to Carlson’s object-level entities, but I retain Carlson’s use of the
marker o (mnemonic for “object-level”) as a subscript to distinguish variables over token-level entities
from variables over kind-level entities.
2 I use the term ‘nominal’ as the most general label for expressions whose main descriptive content is
provided by a noun. More specic terms such as NP (noun phrase) and DP (determiner phrase)
will be used when relevant.
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formal distinction between kinds and descriptions of kinds thus has a counterpart
in the cognitively oriented literature. Both Löbner and Barsalou consider concepts
and kinds as distinct: Concepts are the descriptive basis for kinds (which Löbner
equates with categories, and which we might assume to be equivalent to Barslou’s
“type” in the quote above). However, this distinction is arguably not exactly the
same one that Müller-Reichau makes: intuitively, the reication of a concept is
not the same thing as a category, a point to which I return below.
Kinds thus serve as a bridge to connect referential and cognitive or conceptual
approaches to meaning, and the goal of this paper is to take a very modest step
onto this bridge. I will do so by proposing a way to resolve the debate about what
exactly common nouns denote by appealing to recent developments in so-called
distributional semantics (see Turney & Pantel 2010 and references in Section 3). This
appeal is in line with recent work that seeks to use distributional representations as
ersatz conceptual representations (see e.g. the papers in Lenci 2008b). The specic
features of these representations and the method I sketch for connecting them
to a relatively standard referential semantic analysis will overcome the limitations
of previous analyses of common nouns in layered approaches to the syntax of
nominals. More generally, the analysis also constitutes a concrete proposal for
combining insights from referential and conceptual approaches to meaning that,
while still very preliminary, I hope will promote further synergies between the two
traditions.
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2, I briey review the two main
uses of kinds within nominals. Section 3 provides a brief introduction to distri-
butional semantic representations. Finally, in section 4 I develop the idea that
such representations could serve as models of common noun denotations and,
very briey, I discuss the implications for kind reference.
2 Carlsonian kinds and determiner phrase semantics
As mentioned in the introduction, Carlson’s (1977) ontology included kind-level
and token-level entities as primitives. He related these kinds and tokens via a
realization relation, R: If a token entity xo realizes a kind yk, then R(xo, yk). By
hypothesis, all token-level entities are realizations of some kind-level entity.
Carlson took common nouns to denote sets of what he called individual-level
entities (the union of kind- and token-level entities, as opposed to stage-level
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entities), and used plurality (in the case of English bare plurals) to convert this
set-type denotation into a kind-referring expression. For example, snake was
assigned a logical translation that can be represented as in (2a), and snakes, as
in (2b). This latter translation says that snakes denotes that kind-level entity all of
whose token instances are snakes (see Carlson 1977:145,3 non-essential details
modied from the original; xi is a variable over the union of kinds and tokens).
(2) a. snake: λxi[snake(xi)]
b. snakes: ιxk[∀zo[R(zo, xk)→ snake(zo)]
The reader is referred to Carlson’s work for the details of how this basic proposal
was incorporated into a broader analysis of English.
Carlsonian kinds were given a different application in Zamparelli 2000. Zampar-
elli argued that full determiner phrases (DPs) have a 3-layered structure consisting of
a kind phrase (KIP), a predicative determiner phrase (PDP), and a strong determiner
phrase (SDP). The goal was to account for a complex array of facts involving the
relation between the internal syntax and semantics of nominals and their external
syntax and semantics, such as the fact that certain kinds of apparent “determiner
stacking” (e.g. the/every/demonstratives + numeral) are possible. (3) provides an
example of a Zamparelli-style syntactic analysis for the DP that one child.
(3) [SDP that [PDP one [KIP child ]]]
We will not go into the details of Zamparelli’s analysis of the SDP and PDP here.
What is relevant for our purposes is his claim that all common nouns project into
nominals as kind phrases and “denote individual ‘kinds of objects’ in the domain.”
(2000: ex. (436)). He then used the type-shifting operations KO and KSK to convert
the kind phrase into an expression that denotes a set of token entities or subkinds,
respectively (see (4) and Zamparelli 2000: ex. (461)-(462), where KIP stands for
the logical translation of the kind phrase; other irrelevant details modied from
Zamparelli’s original).
(4) a. KO(KIP) : λxo[R(xo,KIP)]
b. KSK(KIP) : λxk∀z[R(z, xk)→ R(z,KIP)]
3 Page numbers correspond to the version of this work published in 1980.
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The output of these operations can then be the input to a higher determiner, as in
(5a) and (5b), respectively: two books in (5a) is understood as referring to two token
books (which could be of the same (sub)kind), while two wines in (5b) necessarily
refers to two dierent subkinds of wine.
(5) a. Max read two books.
b. Max produces two wines.
Curiously, Carlson’s and Zamparelli’s analyses of common nouns are essentially
inverses of each other. Carlson takes common nouns to be fundamentally descrip-
tions or predicates and uses syntax to convert them into referring expressions.
Zamparelli takes them to be fundamentally referring expressions and uses syntax
to convert them into descriptions or predicates.
One phenomenon that might be thought to distinguish between these two
analyses is modication. McNally & Boleda 2004 argued that relational adjectives
such as legal in (6a), in contrast to other adjectives, such as clever in (6b), denote
descriptions of kinds, rather than of token entities.
(6) a. a legal adviser
b. a clever adviser
On this analysis, legal and similar adjectives serve to restrict kind descriptions,
thus forming subkind descriptions, which are later converted to descriptions of
token entities that can be further restricted with token-entity modiers such as
clever. Though McNally and Boleda did not use the layered DP structure, their
proposal can easily be adapted to the layered analysis, as shown in (7). The noun
denotes a set of (sub)kinds (including not only the maximally general adviser kind
but also legal advisers, political advisers, economic advisers, etc.), represented as
in (7a). The relational adjective also denotes a set of kinds, those that stand in some
relation to the law: for example, (legal) system, (legal) document, (legal) issue,
as in (7b).4 These combine at the KIP level (7c), and the result can serve as the input
to a variant of the KO type-shifter (call it KO′) that, instead of taking kinds, takes
4 McNally and Boleda treated the adjective as a rst order property that combined with the noun
intersectively via an ad hoc composition rule; here I treat it as a second order property for the sake of
simplicity. The dierence is not crucial.
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descriptions of kinds and saturates the kind variable (7d,e).5 The resulting property
of tokens can combine (e.g. via predicate conjunction) with other token modiers,
such as clever, to yield descriptions such as clever legal adviser ; see (7f,g).
(7) a. adviser: λxk[adviser(xk)]
b. legal: λPkλxk[Pk(xk) ∧ legal(xk)]
c. [KIP legal adviser]: λxk[adviser(xk) ∧ legal(xk)]
d. KO′: λPkλxo[R(xo, yki) ∧ Pk(yki)]
e. KO′([KIP legal adviser]):
λxo[R(xo, yki) ∧ λxk[adviser(xk) ∧ legal(xk)](yki)]
= λxo[R(xo, yki) ∧ adviser(yki) ∧ legal(yki)]
f. clever: λPoλxo[Po(xo) ∧ clever(xo)]
g. clever legal adviser:
λxo[R(xo, yki) ∧ adviser(yki) ∧ legal(yki) ∧ clever(xo)]
Note that once the type-shifter KO′ applies, we no longer have a property of
kinds; rather, we have a property of token entities. This entails that any kind-level
modiers will have to combine with the noun before the type-shifter. The layered
structure also guarantees that any token entity modiers will have to apply after
the type-shifter. These constraints, as McNally and Boleda observed, lead to a
natural account of the fact that relational adjectives must appear closer to the
noun than other sorts of adjectives, as shown in (8):
(8) a. a clever legal adviser
b. ??a legal clever adviser
Now let us return to the main issue, which is the distinction between treating
the contents of KIP as a kind-level entity vs. a description of such entities. Neither
analysis is completely satisfactory. Treating nouns as kind-denoting leaves the
mechanics of modication involving relational adjectives and related phenomena6
imperfectly explained. On this hypothesis, the contents of KIP denotes an entity,
which is then fed into the KO or KSK type shifter to yield a property that can
5 This is done here indexically, following McNally and Boleda. However, it could be done by other
means, such as existential closure. Another variant on this analysis involves using the functional
projection Number for the purpose eected here by KO; see Espinal 2010, Arsenijević et al. 2014 for
details of this latter alternative.
6 See e.g. Espinal 2010 for additional examples.
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eventually combine with a determiner. Let’s assume, following McNally and Boleda,
that the adjective in (6a) denotes a property of kinds, and let’s represent the kind
denoted by adviser as a. If we combine the adjective and the entity-denoting noun
directly, the result is a proposition:
(9) legal(a)
A proposition is not the right sort of semantic object to feed the rest of the semantic
composition of the DP.
Alternatively, we could rst apply the type shifter KSK to the kind denoted
by adviser:
(10) KSK(a) : λxk∀z[R(z, xk)→ R(z, a)]
However, this output denotes a set of kinds, not a kind, and therefore cannot serve
as input to the KO type shifter for purposes of creating a description of token
entities. While we could of course posit both KO and a counterpart KO′ like that
used in the alternative analysis in (7), a perfect parallelism between the derivation
of clever adviser and clever legal adviser is lost. In the former case, only KO would
apply to generate a description that could combine with clever ; in the latter, rst
KSK and then KO′ would apply. Not only is this inelegant: crucially, it fails to
capture the fact there is no evidence that adviser and legal adviser are of distinct
semantic types.
The analysis of common nouns as properties of kinds fares better on this point,
insofar as it maintains a parallelism between the semantics of adviser and legal
adviser. However, it has a couple of weaknesses. First, it forces the introduction
of a kind variable as an ordered argument of the noun whose existence is motivated
exclusively by the need to mediate modication (see McNally 2006 for more on this
point). If, as (7g) suggests, the phrase clever legal adviser introduces a variable
yki referring to the legal adviser kind, we might expect that variable to license
discourse anaphora systematically. However, such reference is not systematically
felicitous, as shown in (11), in which it is very dicult to interpret they as picking
out legal advisers in general (as opposed to clever legal advisers).
(11) The banker avoided jail thanks to clever legal advisers. They are usually
worth the investment.
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While there could be a variety of explanations for this fact, it is hardly a merit
of the analysis in (7g).
A second weakness of both this analysis and Zamparelli’s, as noted in the intro-
duction, is that this appeal to kinds and kind descriptions implicitly acknowledges
that not all descriptive content within the DP is fullling the same function: kind-
level modiers serve to create subkind descriptions – complex concepts, in Löbner’s
sense of concept mentioned above – while token-level modiers simply provide
additional description of the referent(s) of the DP. Our understanding of the former
function is not particularly aided by a characterization grounded in a fundamentally
referential semantics of the sort that Carlson used, and indeed Löbner (loc. cit.)
suggests that common nouns pick out concepts. However, if indeed the layered
approach is justied, it suggests that, conversely, not all descriptive material with
the DP serves to form complex concepts, and therefore we do not necessarily want
to abandon a referential approach to meaning entirely.
As a concrete proposal for bringing something of the spirit of conceptual seman-
tics into a referential framework, with the specic goal of being able to model
the composition of subkind descriptions in a more interesting way than is possible
using standard formal semantic tools, I will appeal to distributional semantics.7
After presenting a brief introduction to the crucial features of distributional seman-
tics in the next section, I will then suggest a method for integrating it into the
layered analysis of DPs.
3 A brief introduction to distributional semantics
Distributional semantic models vary in detail, but the sorts of models that will
concern us all represent expression meanings as vectors or matrices based on
co-occurrence distributions in a corpus. For example, in the study described in
Boleda et al. 2013, to represent a noun, we automatically compiled the number of
occurrences of that noun with each of the 10000 most frequent content words in our
corpus (chosen from nouns, verbs, adjectives and adverbs), within a same-sentence
window. Using these criteria, in the representation of dog, the count for the verb
bark, would include the instance of bark in (12a), but not that in (12b).
7 The terms Latent Semantic Analysis and vector-space semantics are also used for essentially this sort of
approach. See Landauer & Dumais 1997 for an early discussion of the psychological interest of
these representations; see Turney & Pantel 2010 and Baroni et al. 2014 for overviews of more recent
developments in distributional semantics and additional background.
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(12) a. The dog barked.
b. We saw the dog. It barked.
Distributional models vary in the number and kinds of expressions that are included
in the vector representation, as well as in the nature and size of the window.8 In the
simplest models the co-occurrence counts follow a “bag-of-words” approach and do
not take into account grammatical information: for example, in the representation
of dog, the count for the verb bark would include both the co-occurrence found
in the sentence the dog barked at the child and in the child barked at the dog.
More sophisticated analyses (e.g. Erk & Padó 2008, Baroni & Lenci 2009) take
the grammatical relations between words into account.9
Table 1 oers a toy example of what distributional representations might look
like for the words dog, cat, car, and ink. From a simple inspection of this example it is
easy to see how distributional representations roughly approximate concepts. High
co-occurrence values for a given word in a vector indicate strong associations; low
values indicate little or no association. Thus, the information in Table 1 suggests
that there is a comparatively strong relation between dogs and fur (and cats and
fur), but no relation between cars or ink and fur. Note that these representations
dier sharply from logical semantic representations insofar as these associations
need not be entailed. For instance, nothing in the lexical entailments for dog,
as these are normally understood by formal semanticists, would directly include
anything about chasing or running, but the distributional representation indicates
some sort of relation between dogs and both running and chasing.
fur bark purr run chase pen
dog 53 22 0 16 29 0
cat 44 2 40 15 45 0
car 0 4 10 10 30 0
ink 0 0 0 10 0 33
Table 1: Toy distributional representations for dog, cat, car, and ink
8 The question of how best to set such parameters is far from trivial, but fortunately it is not crucial to
the point being made in this paper. I therefore will not explore it further here.
9 Note also that typically, the information in these vectors is compressed by additional mathematical
operations such as Singular Value Decomposition or Nonnegative Matrix Factorization. These details
will not concern us here.
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Crucial for our purposes is the fact that distributional representations for words
can be combined to make distributional representations for phrases (see Mitchell
& Lapata 2010, Baroni & Zamparelli 2010, Garrette et al. 2011, Coecke et al. 2011,
Clarke 2012, Copestake & Herbelot 2012, Socher et al. 2012, Lewis & Steedman
2013, Grefenstette 2013, Baroni et al. 2014 and references cited in these works
for various proposals and general discussion). Even more interestingly, there is
a very lively debate over whether it is preferable to rely exclusively on distributional
representations for modeling sentence meaning, or whether distributional semantics
might be better used in combination with logical semantics, and limited to modeling
only some parts of sentence semantics. One of the roots of this debate is the fact that
distributional models work well for what we might loosely refer to as “content words”
and short phrases made up of them, but fare rather poorly with “function” words
such as determiners, auxiliary verbs, or conjunctions – that is, those expressions that
referential semantic approaches handle well. These and other considerations will lead
us to use a combination of distributional and formal modeling in the next section.
Before moving on, however, let me briey illustrate semantic composition with
distributional representations so that the potential for improvement over the
analyses presented in the previous section becomes apparent. One nds signicant
variation not only in the operations used to combine vector, for words but also
in other parameters, such as whether specic values in the operations should be
weighted. Here we will limit ourselves to using the simplest method, namely vector
addition, to illustrate. Table 2 presents a toy model of how the vectors for two
words can be added to yield a vector representation for a phrase.
bright irritated burn stop warn apple
red 99 20 40 98 29 15
ag 19 2 1 50 45 0
skin 6 90 79 8 2 15
red ag 118 22 41 148 74 15
red skin 105 119 119 106 31 30
Table 2: Semantic composition modeled by vector addition
What can be observed is that when two words share high values for a given co-
occurrence item in the vector (e.g. stop in the case of red and ag), the association
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between that item and the resulting phrase is proportionally strengthened – for
example, the association between stop and red ag is stronger than that for stop and
red. Conversely, when two words share low values for some item, the corresponding
value for the resulting phrase is proportionally weakened. When the values on an
item for individual words go in opposite directions (e.g. bright for red and skin), the
value for the result lies somewhere in between.
The quality of distributional representations as models of meaning can be evalu-
ated in at least two dierent ways. First, since vector representations fundamentally
encode similarity relations, one can measure the similarity between words or
phrases as determined by the model against human judgments of similarity. One
specic measure of similarity is the cosine between the vector for a word or phrase
of interest and that of some target: a cosine of 0 indicates orthogonality, i.e. high
dissimilarity; the higher the cosine, the greater the similarity. Another measure is
the quality of the so-called nearest neighbors of a vector for an expression matched
against human judgments. The nearest neighbors of a vector v are those vectors
with the largest cosine values with respect to v. Thus, vectors that are nearest
neighbors are very similar, and we would expect the expressions they represent to
be judged as very similar by humans. Table 3 oers an example (larger numbers
of neighbors than just 3 could of course also be evaluated). Note that nearest
neighbors need not be of the same grammatical category; it is also relevant to
consider not only the quality of the nearest neighbors but also their density, that is,
their absolute distance from the vector of interest and from each other.
historical map important route
topographical important transport
atlas important road
historical material major road
Table 3: The 3 nearest neighbors of the corpus-derived distributional vectors of two
ANs (from Baroni and Zamparelli 2010), cited in Table 4 of Baroni et al. 2014.
A second way to evaluate the quality of distributional representations is to
test them on a specic task, such as the analogical reasoning tasks given on the
SAT exam (see Turney & Pantel 2010 for examples). The fact that machines using
distributional representations are currently able to perform at levels comparable to
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humans on such tasks suggests that the representations are at least in some sense a
meaningful model of human semantic knowledge.
Distributional representations for words, as well as operations such as vector
addition for combining them, have a number of interesting features for the model-
ing of certain aspects of semantic composition in natural language that are not
shared by logical models. Perhaps the most important one is that they are rel-
atively successful at handling the resolution of polysemy and co-composition-type
phenomena (Pustejovsky 1995), particularly for small phrases and generic contents
(Boleda et al. 2013, McNally & Boleda to appear). They also oer the possibility
of modeling metaphor (e.g. Kintsch 2000, Lemaire & Bianco 2003, Utsumi 2006).
The fact that distributional representations can be constructed using exactly the
same method for both words and phrases in a sense blurs the line between word
and phrase, suggesting an interesting avenue for exploring the origins and nature
of idiomatic expressions. Finally, as noted above, these representations make no
sharp distinction between “linguistic meaning” and world knowledge; depending
on one’s view of meaning, this is a bug or a feature. In addition to these theoretically
relevant properties, they have the practical advantage of being very easy to build
automatically for very large lexicons.
However, distributional models also have limitations beyond their poor han-
dling of function words mentioned above. First, it is not obvious how to model
phenomena grounded in reference and discourse dynamics, such as anaphora or
information structure. Second, at present distributional models say little or nothing
about how to capture mid-level semantic generalizations of the sort that are embod-
ied in approaches that posit semantic features for causation, change, agentivity,
etc. Third, it is not obvious how these models can account for most patterns of
entailment and logical inference, particularly those based on the behavior of logical
connectives such as conjunction, disjunction, or negation. For a review of all of
these issues, see Baroni et al. 2014. Finally, there is some question as to the adequacy
of distributional representations as models for language acquisition (Lenci 2008a,
Copestake & Herbelot 2012, though see also Landauer & Dumais 1997). Though
these limitations are daunting, distributional models are an active area of research
and eorts are under way to overcome them or, as will be done here, to nd an
optimal division of labor between distributional and formal modeling (see Kamp
et al. 2013 and references cited therein).
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4 Distributional representations as alternatives to kinds
and kind descriptions
With this brief introduction to distributional semantics in hand, let us return to the
focus of the paper, namely, if we accept the layered DP hypothesis, how do we
analyze the noun at the heart of the DP so as to avoid the weaknesses both of the
kind-as-entity and the kind-description accounts? Recall the problems: If kinds are
treated as entities, it is not obvious how to handle modication processes that
produce expressions picking out subkinds. On the other hand, if we treat nouns as
kind descriptions we end up introducing a variable into the syntax, corresponding
to the kind that is described, whose existence is not otherwise motivated. Moreover,
on both accounts, the notions of kind and kind description are rather poor.
Let us suppose that we treat common nouns as denoting distributional representa-
tions (or sometimes I will use simply distributions for short).10 In other words, we
use distributional representations instead of Carlsonian kinds or kind-descriptions,
the intuitions being 1) that the distributional representation serves as a convenient
way of modeling a concept and 2) kinds have been used, for better or for worse, as
the referential semantics counterpart to concepts (more on this latter point below).
Distributions will be represented in the logical translations by constants with an
arrow over them, as in (13a), to distinguish them from constants that refer to or-
dinary entities; following Espinal 2010, I will refer to the lowest layer of the nominal
where nouns are inserted as NP, rather than KIP. I will use Number as the functional
projection that contributes the type shifter KO′, which creates properties of token
entities, as in (13b), where the definition of the type shifter and the realization
relation R are revised to select for distributions rather than kinds (i.e., dr is the
variable over distributions). The R relation holds between an entity and a distribu-
tion (understood here as standing in for a concept) just in case the entity in question
is taken as an instance or exemplar of that concept. If we combine a simple noun
such as adviser with KO′, the result is a predicate of token entities, as in (13c).
(13) a. [NP adviser]:
−−−−−→
adviser
b. [Num KO′]: λdrλxo[R(xo, dr)]
c. [NumP KO′[NP adviser]]: λxo[R(xo,
−−−−−→
adviser)]
10 The expression “denotes a...representation” should not raise any concern, insofar as these representa-
tions are mathematical objects and not translations of natural language into some other representational
language that then needs to be interpreted.
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Let us further assume a parallel analysis for adjectives. We have seen that (McNally
& Boleda 2004) argued that adjectives, like nouns, must be able to denote properties
of kinds, in addition, in most cases, to being able to denote properties of token
entities. We can therefore hypothesize that adjectives also denote distributional
representations and can be converted into properties of token entities in combination
with functional structure in the morphosyntax. This functional structure will be
different from that which is relevant for nouns (e.g. Number, as suggested in footnote
5), insofar as adjectives typically do not have the same function in language as do
nouns. For example, one candidate might be Agr(eement) (see e.g. Cinque 2005), and
indeed this is what I will assume here for the sake of illustration.
I will also assume a second dierence between adjectives and nouns. Instead of
introducing the realization relation R, I take the adjective’s functional structure to
introduce a bearer relation (represented in (14) as Bear) between the distributional
representation and the individuals to which it is ascribed, as illustrated in the
logical translation in (14) for the adjective clever. I take the bearer relation to be
distinct from the realization relation insofar as when an individual stands in the
former relation to some concept, that concept will be manifest in that individual
without serving as a criterion for identifying the individual; when an individual
stands in the latter relation to some concept, that concept can be said to be both
manifest in the individual and to serve as a criterion for indentity.11
(14) a. [AP clever]:
−−−−→
clever
b. Agr: λdrλxo[Bear(xo, dr)]
c. [AgrP Agr [AP clever]]: λxo[Bear(xo,
−−−−→
clever)]
11 On this view, adjectives and nouns, as represented in the lexicon, differ only in the sorts of concepts
that they represent. We might therefore expect an expression like clever to be able to combine with
functional structure like Number to make a description that serves to identify individuals. Indeed, this
sort of thing is possible, as illustrated in English examples in (i) from Glass (2014) and the Dutch ones in
(ii) from McNally & de Swart (2015), though its nature and productivity vary from language to language.
(i) a. In Tacloban, the dead are being taken to a mass grave in a public cemetery.
b. “progress” always seems to go in one direction — toward the dead and the dull.
(ii) a. Hoe
how
leer
teach
je
you
een
a
kind
child
dat
that
het
it
niet
not
met
with
een
a
vreemde
strange
mee
with
mag
may
gaan?
go
‘How do you teach a child not to leave with a stranger?’
b. Ze
they
moeten
must
wennen
get-used
aan
to
al
all
het
the
nieuwe,
new
al
all
het
the
vreemde
strange
dat
that
dit
this
land
land
hen
them
biedt.
oers
‘They must get used to everything new, everything strange that this land oers them.’
See McNally & de Swart 2015 and references cited there for more general discussion of the syntax and
semantics of such constructions.
52
Kinds, descriptions of kinds, concepts, and distributions
With these elements in hand, we can now develop an analysis of modication at the
NP level that distinguishes it from modication above NP and that overcomes the
problems faced by the analyses in section 2. We now have as the basic denotation
for nouns and adjectives saturated, concept- or kind-description-like objects for
which interesting compositional rules, such as the vector addition illustrated in the
previous section, are dened. We need only posit that semantic composition within
the NP involves not functor-argument application or predicate conjunction, but
rather vector addition (or whatever vector compositional method eventually proves
to be most eective). The result of this operation will a new vector – that is, an
object of the same semantic type as the noun. Specically, we can revise the rst
step of the derivation (7) as in (15), where + stands for the composition operation
that combines two distributional representations, e.g. vector addition.
(15) a. [NP adviser]:
−−−−−→
adviser
b. [NP legal]:
−−−→
legal
c. [NP legal adviser]: +(
−−−→
legal,
−−−−−→
adviser)
We therefore maintain a uniform analysis of all expressions in the NP category,
whether simple or complex, improving upon the kind analysis of common nouns. We
also avoid any appeal to variables that do not have any motivation beyond mediating
in semantic composition, thus improving upon the kind-description analysis.
Exactly like simple nouns, complex NPs such as that in (15c) can be turned into
predicates of token entities via the KO′ type shifter, as in (16a). At this point,
an adjective phrase that has also been converted to a predicate of token entities as
in (14) can be conjoined with it in the usual fashion used for modication in formal
semantics. In this way, it is possible to derive an analysis of phrases like clever legal
adviser that distinguishes two kinds of adjectival modication, as in (16b,c).
(16) a. [NumP KO′[NP legal adviser]]: λxo[R(xo, +(
−−−→
legal,
−−−−−→
adviser))]
b. [AgrP Agr [AP clever]]: λxo[Bear(xo,
−−−−→
clever)]
c. [NumP[AgrP Agr [AP clever]] [NumP KO′[NP legal adviser]]]:
λxo[R(xo, +(
−−−→
legal,
−−−−−→
adviser)) ∧ Bear(xo,−−−−→clever)]
The use of distributional representations to model common noun and adjective de-
notations has some additional advantages. I close this section by briey mentioning
three of these.
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First, the use of these representations allows for the integration into formally-
oriented semantic analysis of techniques for handling the problems of polysemy
in modication and other phenomena involving the lexicon that are poorly handled
by traditional formal semantic tools. This integration can improve the empirical
coverage of existing formal semantic theories and yield models that are better
suited to natural language processing.12
Second, distributional models arguably come closer to capturing the intuition
that common nouns and adjectives name concepts, and thus establish a point of
connection to conceptual approaches to meaning. Having a richer model of what
words and phrases describe than that provided by kinds or descriptions of kinds
brings formal semantics, with its emphasis on reference, closer to that sector of
cognitive science that is concerned with conceptual representation. Indeed, concep-
tually oriented semantic theories have arguably attracted much more attention
from cognitive scientists than have referential theories precisely because they
focus specically on the cognitive component of meaning; referential theories have
largely failed in this respect.
On the other hand, conceptual and cognitive approaches to meaning represen-
tation (e.g. Frame Semantics, Fillmore & Baker 2010) have met resistance from
formally-oriented semanticists both because of concerns about how to ground the
representations and because of skepticism about implementability on a large scale.
Though distributional models as described here are still highly inadequate as models
of concepts, they can be augmented, e.g. by incorporating image information (see
e.g. Andrews et al. 2014), and the ease with which they can be constructed and
implemented makes them useful as a methodological tool. Mixed conceptual and
referential approaches are also arguably less susceptible to concerns about grounding.
Finally, integrating distributional representations into a formal semantics via a
specic hypothesis about the syntax/semantics interface allows us to return to
and address in a clearer way an issue alluded to in the introduction. I noted that
Müller-Reichau 2011 proposes that kinds are the reication of concepts, while
the view of Barsalou 2000 and Löbner 2002 seems to be that kinds are categories
of entities that are established based on conceptual information. If we now ask
ourselves what kind terms such as snakes or the snake in (1), repeated in (17),
denote, we can consider at least two explicit hypotheses.
12 See especially Garrette et al. 2011, Copestake & Herbelot 2012, Lewis & Steedman 2013, Kamp et al.
2013, Erk 2016, and Baroni et al. 2014 for discussion and examples.
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(17) a. Snakes are reptiles.
b. The snake is a reptile.
Following Müller-Reichau, a kind term should arguably have a representation such
as the following, picking out the unique distributional representation – the concept
– associated with snake.
(18) ιdr[dr =
−−−→
snake]
In other words, when we use the snake generically, we are referring to the snake
concept, rather than to any class of individuals that it might serve to individuate.
If we maintain the analysis of common nouns developed in the previous section,
this would also be the predicted denotation for definite kind terms if we accept the
syntactic analysis of them defended in Espinal 2010, where (based on independent
considerations) such DPs are assigned a syntax in which Number does not intervene:
(19) [DP [D′ the [NP snake]]
Interestingly, this is more explicit than the semantics that emerges from Espinal’s
proposal, which is based on the premise that common nouns denote descriptions of
kinds. The representation for the semantics of (19) given her assumptions would
thus be as in (20):
(20) ιxk[snake(xk)]
Whether this is substantively equivalent to (19) of course depends on whether
kinds are equivalent to concepts or not, an issue that the formal literature has done
a notoriously poor job of addressing (see e.g. the discussion in Müller-Reichau 2011,
Chapter 3). One advantage of the introduction of distributional representations is
that it forces one to address precisely this issue.
On the other view, where concepts serve to support categorization of entities as
belonging to one kind or another, the notion of kind or category is not the reication
of a concept. As a result, whatever semantics we assign to the kind terms in (17), it
should not be that in (19). For example, we might consider the sort of proposal
advocated in Chierchia 1998, on which kinds are conceived of as “regularities that
occur in nature...similar to individuals like you and me, but [whose] spatiotemporal
manifestations are typically ‘discontinuous”’ (p. 348). Formally, Chierchia models
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kinds as “individual concepts of a certain sort: functions from worlds (or situations)
into pluralities, the sum of all instances of the kind” (p. 349). Implemented in
the system proposed here, a rst attempt a such a semantics for the snake would
look as follows:
(21) [DP [D′ the [NumP snake]]: λw[maxxo[Rw(xo,
−−−→
snake)]]
If we assume that xo ranges over both singular (atomic) and plural (nonatomic)
entities, the result is very close but not identical to what Chierchia proposes.
Interestingly, he adds a slight renement on which the sum identied by the
equivalent of maxxo[R(xo,
−−−→
snake)] is converted into an atomic group whose
members are not accessible for compositional semantic purposes (Landman 1989a,
1989b). In other words, he essentially reies the class of entities picked out by
(21). However, on what morphological basis this additional reication is motivated
is not clear.
Though this is not the place to decide what is, in fact, the best analysis of the
dierent sorts of nominals that appear in generic sentences,13 this brief discussion
has allowed us to model two dierent possibilities in an explicit and easily dis-
tinguishable fashion. This is arguably an improvement over the previous situation,
in which the use of the same formal object, namely kinds, both to model common
noun denotations (whether directly, or indirectly via descriptions of kinds) as well
as to model the denotations of DPs such as the snake, hampered the identication of
relevant dierences between dierent proposals. Given the semantics for common
nouns advocated here, the analysis on which kind terms such as the snake refer
to the concepts themselves, rather than to the class of entities identied by the
concept, is derived more naturally from the syntactic structure. To the extent
that this result might seem prima facie counterintuitive, the implications for the
analysis of generic sentences as well as for so-called kind-referring predicates such
as to be extinct are non-trivial.
13 It should also be noted in passing that both Chierchia and Espinal suggest analyses for bare plurals in
English that are distinct from the analyses they defend for general denite singulars; I set aside
bare plurals because a proper treatment of them would take us too far aeld.
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5 Conclusion
The linguistic salience of something like Carlsonian kinds has been amply sup-
ported in the formal linguistics literature, as has the idea that DPs have a layered
structure in which kinds or descriptions of them serve as the semantic core. I have
argued here that distributional representations have potential to serve as models
for the semantics of this lowest layer, with the advantage that there are explicit
compositional mechanisms for combining them that make interesting and testable
predictions, and that they avoid using otherwise unmotivated variables in the
composition process. I have also very briey sketched how these representations
could be integrated into a more standard compositional semantic framework.
Though the paper has focused on layered DPs, it is possible to imagine extending
the analysis advocated here to other linguistic categories. Within what Borer
2003 refers to as “exo-skeletal” approaches to morphosyntax, such as Distributed
Morphology (Halle & Marantz 1993; see Borer 2003 for additional references to
related work), the open-class lexicon consists of:
...sound-meaning pairs, where by meaning we refer to the appropriate notion of
a concept, and where by sound we mean an appropriately abstract phonological
representation. Following tradition, I will refer to that reservoir as the encyclo-
pedia, and to items within it as encyclopedic items (EIs). Crucially, an EI is not
associated with any formal grammatical information concerning category, argu-
ment structure, or word-formation. It is a category-less, argument-less concept,
although its meaning might give rise to certain expectations for a felicitous con-
text... (Borer 2003, p. 34)
These lexical items combine with other, possibly abstract, morphemes in the lexi-
con that contribute functional material (e.g. plural morphology, tense) that convert
them into categorized expressions – full-edged nouns or verbs, for example.
The similarities to the layered DP hypothesis are obvious, and in particular,
the idea that these category-less encyclopedic items are paired with concepts
looks very much like the idea we have developed in the previous section. We
might therefore consider extending distributional representations to model the
denotations of roots more generally. But that is a task for another paper.
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